After the dictatorships of Hugo Banzer (1971-1978) and Luis García Meza (1980-1981), the Bolivian bureaucratic-authoritarian model began to run out. The repressive practices, the loss of prestige of the military leadership and corporate fragmentation led to the decline of the Military Junta that handed over power in 1982. The post-democratic transition mobile phone number list forced the Armed Forces to show an institutionalist image and one of respect for the Constitution. However, this image was not accompanied by a ruling political class that assumed adequate civilian leadership and this limited the Bolivian democratization process to a "pragmatic civil-military mobile phone number list coexistence pact," in the words of military officer and sociologist Juan Ramón Quintana.
In 1985, within the framework of a political context known as the Pact for Democracy, Brigadier General César López openly questioned the National Security mobile phone number list Doctrine, which committed the military to the fight against drug trafficking, terrorism and subversion. Before Morales came to power, the armed ranks began to recognize that the threats to Bolivian security were compounded by poverty, corruption, inequality, and weak institutions. By 1985, the doctrine had changed. Bolivia's enemy had become social injustice.
Already in the democratic years, the Armed Forces turned their focus to maintaining internal order and preserving a certain autonomy to protect Bolivian mobile phone number list institutions and democracy under the principle of "State is Homeland." Two critical moments preceded Morales' electoral triumph in 2006. In 2003, the so-called "Black October" occurred. It was a violent repression by the military of the popular insurrection that led to the prosecution of then President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada and the military High Command.